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 Abstract 
 
We examine the drivers of bidding success in multiple-bidder merger and acquisition 
(M&A) announcements. We employ a series of logistic regression analyses and find that 
higher company value, greater profitability, a friendly offer attitude and a compatibility in 
industry specialization between bidders and targets serve as powerful determinants of the 
success of a given M&A attempt when multiple bidders are present. Our findings also 
suggest that if a small bidder (relative to its target) wants to be the final winner among the 
multiple bidders, the company’s growth opportunities are valued most by the target 
company’s shareholders. A second research is conducted to estimate a series of 
cross-sectional regression models to explore the determinants of target and bidder 
announcement returns respectively. Our findings suggest that the market already knows 
around the time of the bidding which bidder will be successful (unsuccessful). The stocks 
of successful bidders display the typical price increase on the announcement date that is 
contrary to the results documented in the literature whereas the abnormal returns of 
unsuccessful bidders fluctuate dramatically during the same period, which can be 
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1. Introduction  
Would you like to risk your life savings on a coin toss? Of course you would not. But yet 
the leaders of many companies have risked their businesses with similar odds in recent 
years – by making disastrous acquisitions, especially among mid-cap companies. Recent 
research indicates that merger and acquisition (M&A)1 activity has an overall success 
rate of about 50% - basically a coin toss.  
 
Most prior scholarly research has explored the strategic management and/or 
organizational culture that influence the success of a corporate merger or acquisition. 
According to Accenture’s M&A Due Diligence – What Corporates Can Learn From 
Private Equity (2006), 48% of survey respondents considered “planning and executing 
the integration process” to be the most important factor in the transaction, when they 
were asked to draw on their recent experience to pinpoint the critical elements of a 
successful M&A transaction. Epstein (2005) uses the merger of J.P. Morgan and Chase 
Manhattan Bank in 2000 to illustrate the drivers of merger success and outlines six 
determinants (i.e., strategic vision and fit, deal structure, due diligence, pre-merger 
planning, post-merger integration, and external factors) of merger success that emphasize 
the importance of both strategy and process. These factors are limited to the manager’s 
strategic before and after the announcement. Strategic mismatch alone is insufficient to 
explain the reason of failure. Greater consideration needs to be taken into financial 
differences.  
 
In addition, much of other literature empirically examines the impact of merger pricing 
(see, Mitchell and Stafford (2004)) or target stock liquidity (see, Massa and Xu (2012)) 
                                                        
1 Please note that for expositional convenience, in this paper, the words acquisition, M&A, merger, and 
takeover are used interchangeably. 
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on the probability of takeover success. Many of these empirical studies focus on the 
targets’ characteristics, i.e., target size, target leverage, target book-to-market ratio, target 
resistance, arbitrage spread, deal structure, terminations fees for the target, etc. 
 
However, relatively few studies on the drivers of bidding success in a multiple-bidder 
takeover have been conducted so far. Our motivation is to fill this gap with empirical 
evidence. Our key assumption is that there are important differences between the winning 
bidders and losing bidders which ultimately affect the bidding result. In addition, we 
believe that managers should be interested in these factors that can influence the 
likelihood of their bidding success, as this information will help them adjust their 
company structure and deal structure in ways that maximize the probability of bidding 
success.  
 
Instead of evaluating the success of the post-merger company (e.g., Lang et al. (1989), 
Epstein (2005), and also Hoang and Lapumnuaypon (2007)), investigate bidding success 
in a bidding war. That is to say, we only consider a bidding firm as being successful in the 
transaction if it beats competitive bidders and acquires the target. Below, we provide an 
example of a bidding war to illustrate our definition of “success”. In 2006, Boston 
Scientific and Johnson & Johnson bid for Guidant, and finally Boston won the takeover 
battle and subsequently acquired Guidant. Competitive contests such as these happen 
frequently in the real business world. To illustrate, Betton et al. (2008) report that the 
initial bidder wins the bid in only two-thirds of ten thousand initial control bids for US 
public targets between 1980 and 2005, though the sample is only limited to the initial 
bidders. Moreover, when a rival bidder appears, the rival wins the bid twice as often as 
the initial bidder. Our study adds to this research area by examining what factors 
differentiate winners and losers and lead to bidding success.  
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There are many other reasons why one bidder is more likely to be successful in a bidding 
war. By using logistic regressions, Flanagan et al. (2011) find that the probability of 
tender offer success is increased by the relatedness of the two firms, cross-border status, 
the existence of termination fees and pre-bid ownership of the target stock, while two-tier 
transactions2, a hostile attitude, and competing bids affect success negatively. Walkling 
(1985) observes that increasing bid premiums or solicitation fees increase the probability 
of success. 
 
We look at all bidders (not just initial bidders) and construct a dataset of all mergers with 
at least two competitive acquirers. The sample consists of 110 takover bids in the U.S. 
market each of which was won by one bidder and that involved one or more unsuccessful 
(losing) bidders3. In this sample, we first compare the firm- and deal-level observable 
characteristics and CEO pay of winners and losers by using mean and median tests. 
Consistent with our assumption, the summarized statistics show the difference. We then 
look at winners’ and losers’ firm characteristics which include bidder’s company value, 
the bidder’s dividend payout, the bidder’s liquidity, its leverage ratio, bidding company’s 
profitability, and the bidder’s growth opportunity. We find if a bidding firm with higher 
company value and good profitability, it is more likely to win the bidding war. We also 
test the effect of deal specifics (i.e., bidder’s relative size to the target, its offer attitude to 
the target, its industry relatedness with the target). Our results are consistent with prior 
research. As for executive compensation, previous work examining CEO compensation 
                                                        
2 A two-tier transaction is one in which the bidder offers a high price for shares that are tendered early and 
a lower price for shares that are tendered later. 
3 We exclude the vast universe of mergers and acquisitions with single bidders that take place in U.S. 
market from our analysis. Instead our sample of multi-bid takeovers focuses on a small subsample of 
only 110 firms. 
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has so far focused on the relationship between CEO pay and company’s performance or 
M&A frequency, while we investigate its impact on the likelihood of bidding success. 
Our results are robust to various sample selection criteria and controls.  
 
Our selected variables and sample design also allow us to evaluate their effect on the 
cumulative abnormal returns for bidders and targets around the announcement day. As 
such, we employ an event study and linear regressions and find that the results vary 
according to different event windows. 
 
Our paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we briefly review the prior literature in 
this area and introduce our hypotheses. Sections 3 and 4 describe the data sample and 
methodology. The empirical results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
Section 7 discusses the limitations of this paper and future research. 
 
2. Literature and hypotheses 
Based on the results of an extensive literature review, we select ten potential determinants 
of bidding success, i.e., the relative size of the bidder to its target, the bidder’s 
book-to-market ratio, the dividends payout ratio of the bidding firm, the bidder firm’s 
liquidity and leverage, its return on equity, the attitude of the transaction (i.e., friendly or 
hostile), the growth opportunities of the bidding firm as proxied by Tobin’s Q, industry 
relatedness, and the bidding firm’s CEO compensation. Table 3 provides definitions for 
all variables used in this paper. 
 
Firm size is one of the organizational variables whose impact on the success of merger 
and acquisition has been studied by numerous scientists. In terms of our sample design, 
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we find it necessary to use relative firm size (RSIZE) as one of our deal-specific 
independent variables. RSIZE is calculated as the bidder’s market value divided by the 
target’s market value. Following prior studies, we assume that a large bidder seems may 
have economies of scale that are valued by the small target. At the same time, the 
acquisition of a relatively small target is less complex. Hawawini and Swary (1990) 
analyze 123 US-bank mergers and acquisitions between 1972 and 1987, and find that 
M&A transactions are more favorable for bidders if the targets are small relative to the 
bidders. Although there is no direct evidence that relative size has an impact on the 
likelihood of bidding success, we may be able to infer the potential relationship from 
another point of view. A larger bidder usually has deeper pockets and can afford a larger 
payment. For instance, Alexandridis et al. (2013) find that large (small) bidders offer a 
mean acquisition premium of 63% (54%) for small targets, but only 41% (28%) for large 
targets. Thus, the bigger the acquiring firm’s size, the greater the probability it wins the 
battle. Also, a large firm is diversified and typically has better access to capital markets, 
thus it may raise funds at a lower cost than a small firm (Dereeper and Turki (2013)). 
Hence, our first hypothesis reads as follows:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The relative size hypothesis  
The bigger the size of the bidder relative to the target, the more likely the bid will be 
successful. 
 
Second, we employ the market performance of the acquirer as an explanatory variable, as 
captured by the book-to-market ratio (BTM). Dong et al. (2006) argue that firms with low 
BTM ratios are more likely to be overvalued. When stocks are richly priced, bidders can 
use their inflated shares to pursue acquisitions. Target shareholders rarely complain, since 
the acquisition price represents a huge premium. On the other hand, evidence shows that 
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bidding competitions result in substantial premiums paid for the target (Pepall and 
Richards (2000)). Accordingly, we hypothesize that a greater acquisition premium may 
contribute to bidding success. Because of data restrictions with respect to the premium 
(especially for unsuccessful bidders), we use BTM to at least partially proxy for the 
premium.  
 
In addition, a low BTM ratio suggests that bidders are well managed and have high 
potential for future growth, which should make the target firm more willing to be 
acquired. In other words, the likelihood of bidding success should increase with a lower 
BTM ratio. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Market valuation hypothesis 
Bidding firms with a lower book-to-market ratio are more likely to succeed in a bidding 
war. 
 
Much of the empirical work focusing on dividend pay examines differences in the 
dividend yield between targets and acquirers. Dereeper and Turki (2013) find that the 
completion rate of M&A deals increases when that difference is lower. No direct 
literature shows the relationship between bidding success and acquirer’s dividend payout. 
Previous studies (Fama and French (2001) and DeAngelo et al. (2004)) show that 
dividend-paying firms generally have larger firm size, higher profitability, and more cash, 
which imply that firms are running well. All these characteristics should translate into a 
higher probability of success of the bid. A higher payout ratio also indicates a more 




Hypothesis 3: Dividend payout hypothesis  
A bidding company with a greater dividend payout ratio is more likely to win a bidding 
war. 
 
To some extent, a company’s ability to meet its short-term obligations is also worthy of 
consideration. Many studies argue that successful acquisitions improve the bidder’s 
liquidity by changing the firm’s characteristics or enlarging the bidder’s size. Yet the 
literature offers few insights into the impact of liquidity on the likelihood of M&A 
bidding success. We believe that target firms prefer more liquid buyers, as firm’s liquidity 
is one of the important aspects of a firm’s financial health. A recent study by Leepsa and 
Mishra (2014) uses the pre-M&A quick ratio as a proxy for the bidder’s short-term 
liquidity and finds that it is a significant determinant of M&A success. We thus specify 
the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Liquidity hypothesis 
If higher liquidity of bidding firms is an appreciated characteristic of the target, we expect 
an acquirer to be more likely to succeed in a bidding war. 
 
Similarly, we employ the leverage ratio (LEV) as a proxy for the bidder’s capital structure. 
The greater the amount of debt in the capital structure, the higher the leverage ratio of a 
company. A high degree of leverage indicates that the firm is exposed to more credit risk 
and can make the business particularly vulnerable during an economic downturn. The 
extant literature provides empirical evidence that shows that a firm’s capital structure is 
significantly related to M&A success. For instance, Uysal (2005) confirms that 
underleveraged bidders pay higher premiums and are more likely to successfully acquire 
targets. Lin (2013) shows that bidders with greater leverage are less likely to complete a 
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successful M&A transaction. Chowdhry and Nanda (1993) argue that excess leverage can 
be used strategically as a commitment to bid aggressively. If this is the case, then highly 
leveraged bidders are more likely to win takeover contests and we should expect a 
positive sign for LEV. Furthermore, the leverage ratio of a bidding firm can proxy for the 
survival of the firm, as underleveraged firms are less likely to go bankrupt4. As a 
consequence, the target management tends to resist the merger attempt of a highly 
leveraged buyer if the benefits of the target management depend on the survival of the 
bidding firm. Besides, Maloney et al. (1993) use the debt-equity ratio as a measure for 
excess debt capacity and document a positive relationship between higher leverage and 
better acquisition decision-making. We thus propose a fifth hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Leverage hypothesis 
A low leverage ratio indicates that a bidder will likely succeed in a bidding contest. 
 
While a firm’s book-to-market ratio provides a long-term measure of the capital market’s 
evaluation of a company, a firm’s return on equity (ROE) offers a more immediate 
measure of corporate performance. Therefore, we measure the profitability of bidders by 
using ROE. ROE measures a company’s profitability by revealing how much profit a 
company generates with the money shareholders have invested, thus it is considered an 
important performance indicator by both investors and management (Lindblom and Von 
Koch (2002)). A high ROE ratio also indicates that a bidding company is more profitable 
than its competitors. Fritsch et al. (2007) employ the cumulative abnormal returns for 
bidders as a proxy for a deal’s success. Nonetheless, when analyzing the target firm’s 
ROE and the relation of the target’s ROE to the bidder’s ROE as a relative profitability 
                                                        
4 Zingales (1998) shows that highly leveraged trucking firms are less likely to survive after the 
deregulation in the trucking industry. 
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measure, they find that neither the target ROE nor the relative ROE have any explanatory 
power for the success of an acquisition. However, prior studies (see, e.g., Hawawini and 
Swary (1990), Pilloff (1996), and Beitel, Schiereck et al. (2004)) suggest that high 
relative ROE reduces the likelihood of a transaction being successful. To the extent that 
mergers and acquisitions are meant to discipline underperforming firms, we assume that 
bidders with a higher ROE are more likely to win. Therefore, we expect that greater 
profitability of the acquirer contributes to the success of an M&A bid. 
 
Hypothesis 6: Bidder profitability hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between the bidder’s ROE and its likelihood of success in 
a bidding war. 
 
As Morck (1988) indicates, failing to distinguish adequately between acquisitions with 
different attitudes can result in misleading findings. Thus, we believe that deal attitude 
may affect the success rate. Muehlfeld et al. (2006) confirm that the attitude of the 
transaction (whether hostile or friendly) is a key factor that determines whether an M&A 
deal is ultimately consummated. Disciplinary takeovers are likely to be hostile, whereas 
synergistic takeovers are likely to be friendly. One purpose of M&A deals is to achieve 
synergy, thus we assume that friendly takeovers are easier to complete. Obviously, a 
friendly M&A offer is easier to achieve, since the target company’s management and 
board of directors agree to the merger or acquisition by a bidding company. To put it 
another way, hostile takeovers probably result in negative emotions between the 
management and professional groups between the buyer and the seller, thus leading to a 
hostile culture where integration and synergies are difficult to achieve. Flanagan et al. 
(2011) find that hostile attitudes negatively affect tender offer success. Using a sample of 
991 tender offers, they show that only 43% of hostile bids are eventually completed while 
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91% of non-hostile bids are completed. Hence, hypothesis 7 reads as follows: 
  
Hypothesis 7: Attitude hypothesis  
If a bidding firm makes a friendly bid, it is more likely to complete the transaction. 
 
Next, we explore a company’s growth opportunities. Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
recognize the impact of growth opportunities on company value. In this paper we select 
Tobin’s Q (TQ) as a proxy for the bidder’s growth opportunities. Martin (1996) explores 
the relationship between payment methods and the acquiring firm’s growth opportunities. 
He examines data covering 846 US M&A deals from 1979 to 1988 and finds that 
acquiring firms with greater growth opportunities are more likely to use share exchanges 
as a payment method in acquisitions. However, this does not determine whether they are 
likely to be successful in the deal. Lang et al. (1989) find that the shareholders of high Q 
bidders gain significantly more than the shareholders of low Q bidders in a sample of 
successful tender offers. Growth opportunities of a firm also affect its capital structure 
goal, which further influence the takeover bid. Like Myers (1977) indicates, debt 
overhang may prevent firms from investing in positive NPV projects. In particular, this 
effect is costly for growth firms. In our paper, we extend these findings by examining 
whether bidders with a high Q are more likely to be successful with their takeover bid. 
Therefore, hypothesis 8 reads as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 8: Growth opportunity hypothesis 
Bidding firms with greater growth opportunities (as measured by Tobin’s q) are more 
likely to be successful in achieving the deal. 
 
Same- or cross-industry acquisitions are also associated with the success of an M&A deal. 
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In this paper, we define an acquisition as a same-industry (i.e., non-diversifying) deal 
versus a cross-industry (i.e., diversifying) deal according to whether the bidder has the 
same or a different two-digit SIC code as the target. Flanagan et al. (1998) expect the 
probability of a successful tender offer to reduce if a bidder is in the same primary 
industry as the target. Their findings, however, suggest the contrary. Moreover, merging 
within the same industry makes the bidding firm obtain complementary skills and 
resources. Related business provides stronger opportunities to gain economies of scope 
and better develop synergies from physical assets or other functional forms than unrelated 
business. Since the bidder already possesses the needed technical and managerial skills to 
run the post-merger entity, we believe that a non-diversifying transaction is easier to be 
completed. Hence, our ninth hypothesis reads as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 9: Industry relatedness hypothesis 
If the bidder is in the same primary industry as the target (i.e., they have a same two-digit 
SIC code), it is more likely to succeed in a bidding war. 
 
Indeed, measures such as transaction-specific factors and firm-related characteristics are 
not enough to explain the dynamic behavior of bidders in M&A deals. In this study, we 
also consider the impact of managerial incentives on bidding success and employ CEO 
incentive compensation as an explanatory variable. Our approach is based on the notion 
that highly compensated CEOs are more experienced and are more likely to succeed in a 
bidding war. Related studies on CEO compensation include Agrawal and Walkling (1994) 
who find that takeover bids occur more frequently in industries in which the CEO has 
significantly positive abnormal compensation. Bliss and Rosen (2001) consider a ten-year 
period from 1986 to 1995 with a sample of 32 banks and find that higher levels of 
stock-based compensation reduce the probability that banks make acquisitions. More 
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recently, Grinstein and Hribar (2004) investigate CEO compensation for completing 
M&A deals. 39% of the acquirers in their sample cite the completion of the deal as a 
reason for their higher compensation. They further confirm that CEOs who have more 
power to influence board decisions receive significantly larger bonuses that mainly come 
in the form of cash. Harford and Li (2003) find that CEOs have clear financial incentive 
to undertake acquisitions. Buchholtz and Ribbens (1994) examine the influence of a 
CEO’s incentives on the likelihood that target firms will resist takeover attempts. Their 
results suggest that the greater the level of CEO stock ownership, the lower the likelihood 
of takeover resistance. Our objective is to test whether highly compensated CEOs are 
really helpful with takeover bids; thus we formulate hypothesis 10 as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 10: CEO compensation hypothesis 
There is a positive relationship between the CEO incentive compensation and the 
likelihood of bidding success.  
 
In our subsequent analyses, we examine whether these ten explanatory variables can help 
explain why certain bidders succeed in a bidding war.  
 
3. Data sources and sample design 
3.1 Selection of competitive bidders  
In this study, we explore the determinants of successful versus unsuccessful takeover bids. 
Our sample is based on M&A deals with multiple bidders in which both the targets and 
the bidders are publicly traded firms that are listed on a U.S. exchange. We include all 
bids in merger contests starting from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 2012 from the 
SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. After that, we retrieve accounting and stock 
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price data from Compustat (including Execucomp), and the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP). To be included in our final sample, firms have to fulfill several 
criteria. We only consider mergers (SDC deal form M) and acquisitions of majority 
interest (AM) that are listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) and the NASDAQ. Our final sample consists of 110 takeover 
bids with multiple bidders and complete data. 
 
Properly differentiating between winners (successful bidders) and losers (unsuccessful 
bidders) is a critical point in this research5. We choose deals with multiple bidders, where 
bidders are defined as contestants in the same merger fight if they bid for the same target. 
That is to say, a transaction must have at least two potential acquirers competing for the 
same target firm. Furthermore, the target company must be successfully (announced & 
completed transaction) acquired by one of the bidding companies. Therefore, the 
company that succeeds in completing a merger is classified as the winner, all other 
bidders as losers. Table 1 provides yearly summary statistics for our sample. 
 
3.2 Collection of firm specific data 
In the case that the announcement of M&A has effect on the firm related data during the 
pre-announcement period, we gather the data that is 92 days (or a quarter) prior to the 
date announced. We further collect firm stock prices and the number of shares 
outstanding from CRSP 20 days prior to the announcement. We match CRSP market data 
with acquirers and targets in the SDC database using the six-digit CUSIP. The firm’s 
                                                        
5 We use SDC flag (Challenged Deal Flag – multiple bidders are bidding for an identical target) for 
contests bids to identify contestants. The deal status is chosen as completed and unconditional. We select 
“disclosed value mergers & acquisitions” and “undisclosed mergers & acquisitions”. Based on the results 
given by SDC, we re-select the data manually in order to drop any repeated data. 
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market value is calculated by the stock price multiplied by the number of shares 
outstanding. This is used as a proxy for the firm size. The CRSP was accessed via the 
Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS), University of Pennsylvania. The resulting 
sample of successful and failed bidders contains 212 and 199 observations, respectively. 
 
We further extract total compensation and total cash compensation data from 
COMPUSTAT’s Execucomp database, using 8-digit CUSIP. Total compensation (TDC1) 
includes salary, bonuses, the total value of restricted stock granted, the total value of 
stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), and long term incentive payouts. Total cash 
compensation (TCC) includes salary and bonuses. The difference between total 
compensation and total cash compensation (TDC1-TCC) is to capture the options and 
incentive components of total compensation. This difference, which we call incentive 
compensation, is one of our independent variables (Cooper et al. (2009)). We further 
adjust the data of CEO incentive compensation by using consumer price index (CPI) with 
the year 1997 as the base. Other firm specific characteristics, (i.e., earnings per share, 
current assets), are from Compustat Fundamental Quarterly. It is necessary to illustrate 
that all the data we selected is adjusted by 12 months moving measure. 
 
Since the first two digits of standard industrial classification (SIC) code indicate the 
major group, we define non-diversifying acquisitions as those in which the bidder and 
target share the two-digit SIC code. We collect the SIC codes from Compustat database, 
which is better specified than CRSP SIC codes (Kahle and Walkling (1996)). We only 
include observations that have complete data so that we can generate reasonable 
estimates in the logistic regression models described below. After deleting all the missing 
data, we have 110 firms (including both successful and failed bidders) that initiated a 
merger bid, which is treated as the full sample. Table 2 presents a complete list of all the 
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variables and their definitions. We will employ Success Dummy as our dependent variable 
in all the logit regressions and the other ten variables as the independent variables. Table 
3 shows the distribution of M&A transactions in the full sample in three categories 
respectively. In the full sample with 110 firms, there are 71 successful bidders and 39 
unsuccessful bidders, as there is a lot of missing data in the failed group. Most bidders 
(74 in 110 firms) have a friendly attitude, but only 16 of the total bidding firms offers a 
non-diversifying M&A. 
 
3.3 Summarized statistics 
Table 4 summarized the statistics of all independent variables that are separated by 
successful and unsuccessful bidders and the last two columns provide the results for a 
Satterthwaite t-test for the significance of differences in means and a Wilcoxon median 
test. As we can see, the average RSIZE of successful bidders (115.2377) is much larger 
than that of failed bidders (9.0026), and moreover, their median test is significantly 
different under 0.1 possibility. Lower BTM ratio of successful bidding firms (60.8278) 
implies that high company value makes a difference in the multiple-bidder takeover. 
Besides, the successful bidders also have the greater average values of LIQ, ROE, TQ, 
and CEO incentive compensation (LNCEOINC), though some of them are not 
significantly from those of unsuccessful bidders. What’s more, the attitude dummy and 
industry dummy are statistically significant on the basis of both tests, suggesting that 
bidding firms are significantly more likely to succeed when they are in the same primary 
industry with the targets and offer friendly takeover. We will show sophisticated analysis 
in the following sections. This evidence suggests that the characteristic between 
successful bidders and failed bidders are worthy of studying. Though the descriptive 
statistics provide us a good understanding of characteristics between successful and failed 





4.1 Measuring Tobin’s Q 
There are many literature that have studied Tobin’s Q with different ways of measure (see 
Moeller et al. (2004) and Lang et al. (1989)). Among those, we employ Chung and 
Pruitt’s (1994) equation as a measure for Tobin’s Q. The approximate Q is simply defined 
as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑄 = (𝑀𝑉𝐸 + 𝑃𝑆 + 𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇)/𝑇𝐴 
 
where  
MVE = share price × the number of common stock shares outstanding, 
PS = the value of preferred stock, 
DEBT = (current liabilities – current assets) + book value of the long-term debt, 
TA = the book value of the total assets. 
 
The estimation of q is simple and tractable, which all data are available in Compustat 
database.  
 
4.2 Logistic regression 
This paper aims to find out the determinants of the likelihood of takeover bidding success. 
We assume that over the given period of time (from 1998 to 2012), any bidding firm can 
be assigned to only one of two categories – successful deal or unsuccessful deal. 
Considering the success of the M&A deal as a dummy dependent variable, we define the 
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𝑝 = the probability for a bidder to win a takeover bid in a bidding war 
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖  = the takeover of the 𝑖 th firm is successful or not. If success, 
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = 1, and 0 otherwise.  
𝑋𝑖
′𝛽𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖1 ∙ 𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽𝑖2 ∙ 𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝛽𝑖3 ∙ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑌 + 𝛽𝑖4 ∙ 𝐿𝐼𝑄 + 𝛽𝑖5 ∙ 𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽𝑖6
∙ 𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝛽𝑖7 ∙ 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐼 + 𝛽𝑖8 ∙ 𝑇𝑄 + 𝛽𝑖9 ∙ 𝐼𝐷 + 𝛽𝑖10 ∙ 𝐿𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐼𝑁𝐶 
𝛼𝑖, 𝛽𝑖𝑡 = the regression parameters for firm 𝑖, 
 
In the logistic model, we determine the likelihood of M&A success as a function of firm’s 
specifics, deal characteristics, industry relatedness, and CEO compensation. We can use 
the variable RSIZE as an example to interpret a positive coefficient. A positive coefficient 
𝛽𝑖1 for RSIZE says that, holding other variables (i.e., BTM, DIVIDPAY, LIQ, LEV, ROE, 
ATTI, TQ, ID, and LNCEOINC) at a fixed value, we will see a one-unit increase in RSIZE 
which would then make the successful deal 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (𝛽𝑖1) likely to occur. As mentioned in 
Section 2.1, we follow the narrow definition of an M&A success. If the bidder is 
successful in the deal, 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 is equal to 1; otherwise, 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 is 
equal to 0 for its competitors.  
 
                                                        
6 As noted in our literature section, the acquisition premium may be an important determinant of 
bidding success. Nevertheless, evaluating how the premium that a bidder offers for the target firm 
affects bidding success is hampered by data unavailability, especially for unsuccessful bidders. 
However, at least to some extent, relative firm’s size and the book-to-market ratio serve as proxies for 
the premium. 
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4.3 Event study and OLS-regression 
Furthermore, we also want to test how factors among those variables mentioned above 
affect the bidders and targets abnormal return of stocks around the announcement day. 
Thus, we employ the methodology for conducting an event study, with the intention to 
detect abnormal returns associated with bidding success, firm and deal specifics, industry 
and CEO compensation. 
 
The discussion so far has regarded the market model, that relates individual stock returns,  
as the most beneficial model for estimating normal returns (e.g., Brown and Warner 
(1985)). Therefore, we review the market model in this analysis and it can be expressed 
as: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡           𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡] = 0      𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑖𝑡) = 𝜎
2 
 
This equation explains stock i’s return in period t, where the constant parameter 𝛾𝑖 and 
the parameter 𝜃𝑖 for the market return variable (𝑅𝑚𝑡) are estimated econometrically for 
each individual stock. The stock return also includes an error term, with expectation zero. 
It is the error term that represents the abnormal return (AR) which reflects the 
announcement of M&A. Aggregating these error terms across the event window, we can 
get 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝜀𝑖𝑡𝑡 , where t is the length of the event window. Finally, we aggregate the 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 across individual stocks and get 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 = ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑖 7. 
 
We extract the abnormal returns for the bidder’s security prices from the CRSP 
equally-weighted index via Eventus software. By default, the market model parameters 
are estimated over the period from -255 trading days to -46 days before the 
                                                        
7 For convenience, we will use CARs instead of 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑖 in the following sections. 
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announcement day. Figure 1 illustrates the event study timeline. 
 
We estimate acquirer or target returns by calculating the AR for the M&A announcement 
date [0] and the CARs over the two event windows around the acquisition announcement 
date: (1) 1 day before the event date through 1 day after the event date, [-1,1], (2) 5 days 
before the event date through 5 days after the event date, [-5,5]. In order to reduce the 
interaction of the bidders, we divide the full sample into two subsamples - firms winning 
the bidding wars and firms failing in the bidding wars. 
 
Further, we employ OLS-regression model to investigate the relationship between CARs 
and bidding success and all the explanatory variables that we previously mentioned. The 
model is expressed as follows: 
  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜎𝑖1 ∙ 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 + 𝜎𝑖2 ∙ 𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝜎𝑖3 ∙ 𝐵𝑇𝑀 + 𝜎𝑖4 ∙ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝑃𝐴𝑌
+ 𝜎𝑖5 ∙ 𝐿𝐼𝑄 + 𝜎𝑖6 ∙ 𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝜎𝑖7 ∙ 𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 𝜎𝑖8 ∙ 𝐴𝑇𝑇𝐼 + 𝜎𝑖9 ∙ 𝑇𝑄 + 𝜎𝑖10 ∙ 𝐼𝐷
+ 𝜎𝑖11 ∙ 𝐿𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑂𝐼𝑁𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
where 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑖  the aggregated cumulative abnormal return of the 𝑖th firm for the 
targets, the successful bidders and the failed bidders  
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = the deal status. If the deal is success, 𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖 = 1, and 0 
otherwise 
𝜇𝑖, 𝜎𝑖𝑡 = the regression parameters for firm 𝑖 
𝜀𝑖 = error term 
 
In this model, we consider bidding success as one of the explanatory variables, while the 
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CARs are put on the left of the equation.  
 
5. Empirical results and robustness tests 
5.1 Testing for multicollinearity 
Table 5 provides Pearson correlation coefficients for all independent variables. From the 
table, we can see that there is a severe multicollinearity between bidder’s liquidity and 
leverage ratio (-0.5793). Even though Morck et al. (1988) find that bidding firms that 
experience hostile takeover bids between 1981 and 1985 are smaller, older, and more 
slowly growing, and they have lower Tobin’s Q, we do not find that there is a strong 
linear relationship between the attitude and the Tobin’s Q, based on the correlation matrix 
shown in Table 5. It might because our research examines a different time period and the 
corporate world has been developing. Considering the correlation between liquidity and 
leverage ratio for bidding firms, we will check the robustness by doing logit regressions 
with excluding either leverage or liquidity in Section 5.3. 
 
5.2 Logistic regression results 
Table 6 presents results for four logit regressions used to estimate the effect of different 
factors on the likelihood of M&A bidding success. Our sample consists of 110 takeover 
bids with multiple bidders that occurred between 1998 and 2012. In each model, the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the bid is successful, and 
zero otherwise. First, in order to examine the effect of CEO compensation, we run the 
logit regression on the CEO incentive compensation. The result is presented by Model 1. 
The positive coefficient of CEO incentive compensation (LNCEOINC) is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level, suggesting that the bidding firm with a larger amount 
incentive compensation paid to its CEO is more likely to be successful in the bidding war.  
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Expect the influence of CEO compensation, we want to test the impact of firm specifics 
in the bidding war. Thus, we employ bidders’ book-to-market ratio, dividend payout, 
liquidity, leverage ratio, return on equity, and Tobin’s Q as explanatory variables in the 
logit regression. Model 2 shows the relationship between the success rate and 
firm-specific factors. However, we find that the coefficient estimates show few and little 
significances in Model 2. Only BTM is negatively related to the takeover success. This 
evidence confirms that the high company value (with low book-to-market ratio) is valued 
most by the targets and the market, which is more likely to increase the likelihood of 
takeover bids. By way of contrast, we do another logit regression for the M&A 
deal-specific factors. We use relative size, offer attitude, and industry relatedness as 
independent variables. Model 3 presents the results for the logit regression. As what was 
expected, relative size, offer attitude, and industry relatedness have important effects on 
the likelihood of M&A bidding success. 
 
Furthermore, we run a logistic regression on the full sample with all ten explanatory 
variables. Model 4 in Table 6 indicates the relationship between these factors and the 
probability of takeover success. Contrary to what was expected, the relative firm size has 
no effect on the probability of takeover success. However, we find that book-to-market, 
offer attitude and industry relatedness for the bidders are positively and significantly 
related with the probability of M&A success, which is consistent with results of Models 2 
and 3. A negative and significant estimate indicates that the book-to-market ratio) reduces 
the bidders completion rate in takeover bids. Based on the coefficient estimates, the 
presence of a friendly attitude from a bidder dramatically increases the odds of likelihood 
of bidding success. Also, the probability of a successful M&A is significantly enhanced 
by an acquiring firm being in the same primary industry as a target, which is consistent 
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with the result from Flanagan et al. (2011). Standing in contrast to the studies of 
Hawawini and Swary (1990), Pilloff (1996), and Beitel, Schiereck et al. (2004), we find 
that in Model 4 ROE has an effect on the success rate, though it is not so significant 
(under 10 percent). A higher ROE can contribute to the success rate, which means the 
more profitable a bidding company, the more likely for it to be successful in a bidding 
war. Given these findings, we cannot reject the hypotheses 2, 6, 7, and 9. Although the 
leverage ratio is not statistically significant under any possibility, it is negatively related 
to the M&A success, which is partly consistent with the findings of Lin (2013). The 
potential explanation is that bidders with a higher degree of leverage are unable to 
provide attractive premiums in takeover offers and thus reducing the likelihood of 
success. As to the insignificance of LNCEOINC in Model 3, we may explain it as the 
effect of CEO compensation being very weak, compared with the firm or the deal 
specifics. 
 
5.3 Robustness tests 
To check the robustness of the regression results shown in Table 6, we do a series of logit 
regressions again with different sample groups. The result is presented in Table 7. First, 
in order to eliminate the effect of extreme values, we remove the top 2% and the bottom 2% 
of all bids in the full sample that is sorted by relative firm size (RSIZE). Nonetheless, we 
find that the return on equity (ROE), offer attitude (ATTI), and industry relatedness effects 
(ID) are still associated with the likelihood of M&A bidding success (Model 1).  
 
According to our discussion in section 5.1, the multicollinearity between bidding firm’s 
liquidity and leverage ratio can bias our estimates. Thus, we re-run the regressions of 
Model 4 in Table 6, by excluding either LEV or LIQ in the list of independent variables. 
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Models 2 and 3 in Table 7 report the results for two tests in which we exclude leverage 
(LEV) and liquidity (LIQ) from our list of regressions. From Model 2, we find that ROE, 
ATTI, and IR are still positively significant and note that the intercept becomes larger and 
significant. Particularly, one more variable in Model 3, BTM, becomes significantly 
negative again, which confirms the results of Model 4 in Table 6. Overall, results do not 
change by eliminating either LEV or LIQ.  
 
Look again at the sample period, we notice that the period of financial crisis lies in 
between 1998 and 2012. The financial crisis has changed the landscape dramatically for 
takeover bids, especially in U.S. market. To capture the effect of financial crisis, we 
divide the entire sample into two sub-samples, using the cutoff point of December 31, 
2006.  
 
Model 4 in Table 7 shows the results of our logit regression for pre-financial-crisis period 
from 1998 to 2006. We find that the significance of coefficients for BTM and ROE 
become even stronger than in Model 4 of Table 6. Furthermore, a larger estimate of ROE 
suggests that the degree of company profitability has a greater effect on the likelihood of 
M&A success. The findings also imply that the support for Hypotheses 2 and 6 is 
stronger in the pre-financial-crisis period (1998-2006) than that in the entire period 
(1998-2012). By contrast, no evidence confirms the relationship between the explanatory 
variables and M&A success in the 2007-2012 period (Model 58 of Table 7). One possible 
explanation could be that the financial crisis has brought chaos to the M&A market and 
therefore all the determinants should be re-considered or re-selected to adapt to the new 
environment. As Grave et al. (2012) argue in their research, bidding companies tend to 
                                                        
8 Since there are only 22 observations in Model 5 of Table 7 but 10 explanatory variables, the inferences 
drawn from this estimation should be viewed with caution. 
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choose the M&A targets who are in new consumer markets, instead of focusing on the 
triad of US, Europe and Japan. Achieving cross-border transaction is becoming more and 
more attractive and can help the bidding firms’ business diversify risk, and maximize 
control, efficiencies and productivity. 
 
Lastly, we find it does make sense to investigate the determinants of M&A success for 
small bidders. “Acquisitions” usually refers to a purchase of a smaller firm by a large one. 
But sometimes, this situation can get inversed. Intuitively, it is more difficult for small 
bidding firms to acquire the management control of large targets. We find several 
empirical studies that are related to the small bidders theory (relative to their targets). 
Hawawini and Swary (1990) analyze 123 US-bank M&A during the period 1972-1987 
and confirm that M&A deals are more favorable for bidders if the targets are relatively 
smaller than the bidders. They also prove that smaller bidders are probably more 
successful than larger ones. In terms of the stock performance, Sapunji and Friedrichsen 
(2011) confirm that bidding companies that acquire relatively large targets do better than 
those acquiring relatively smaller targets. Thus, we think it necessary to test the 
robustness with regard to the relative firm size. 
 
The remaining columns of Table 7 present related robustness checks. We make two 
subsets from the entire sample. Model 69 provides the results of a sub-sample with 
RSIZE equal to and smaller than 1. As we can see, only ATTI and TQ can best determine 
the bidding success, while the coefficient estimates for other variables are not significant. 
That is to say, if a small bidding company attempts to acquirer a large target, its offer 
attitude and the firm’s growth opportunity (proxied by Tobin’s Q) seem to be the positive 
                                                        
9 Similar to Model 5, since there are only 33 observations in Model 6, the inferences drawn from this 
model should be treated with caution. 
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signs to the large target, as well as the financial market. In general, a hostile bidder 
typically encounters many difficulties, but an interesting finding is that the estimate of 
ATTI is negative. Since our explanatory variables are limited to only ten factors, there 
might be other fundamentals, which are also valued by the relatively large targets. 
Compared to Model 6, Model 7 presents completely different results. No evidence shows 
that any determinants are related to the success rate. We believe that it is because the 
large bidders own the predominance and these factors have little influence in the 
transaction. 
 
To summarize, our findings in Table 6 are robust to reduced sample that has extreme 
values, selected variables, and time periods. Given the empirical results from both Tables 
6 and 7, we conclude that the likelihood of bidding success increases with higher 
company value (lower BTM), higher return on equity, a friendly takeover, and the degree 
of being in the same primary industry with the target takeover.  
 
5.4 Event study and OLS regression results 
Above, we argued that a bidder with higher company value and profitability, a friendly 
offer attitude, and more industry closeness is more likely to succeed in a bidding war. In 
this section, we want to investigate how these factors affect the bidders’ or targets’ 
abnormal returns around the announcement date. Figure 2 displays the daily abnormal 
returns of successful bidders, failed bidders, targets and combined entity of successful 
and failed bidders from 5 days before the event date through 5 days after the event date. 
Contrary to prior studies, the successful bidder’s abnormal returns decrease a few days 
before M&A is announced, but bounce back after the announcement. However, the 
abnormal returns of unsuccessful bidders fluctuate dramatically during the same period, 
which can be discerned clearly from the successful group. We can see that targets’ daily 
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average abnormal returns go up and then fall around the announcement date. Borges and 
Gairifo (2013) explain it as the pre-announcement run-up of prices being higher when 
there are rumors published in the median about a possible acquisition. 
 
Table 8 displays the mean and median CARs associated with the announcements of 
acquisitions by the targets sample, successful-bidders sample, and failed-bidders sample 
in the U.S. market from 1998 to 2012. Panel A in Table 8 shows the mean CARs for the 
successful bidders in three event windows, which are -0.51%, -0.32%, and -0.19% 
respectively. Contrary to the typical stock price drop on the announcement date that has 
been often documented in the literature, we find that the successful bidders display the 
price increase due to the announcement effect. For those firms who failed in the bidding 
war, we find that the CARs on time windows [0] and [-5, 5] are strongly significant 
different from 0 under the 5 percent level and they even earn positive abnormal returns 
(0.38%) in event window [-1, 1]. When lengthening the time frame pre- and 
post-announcement, the successful bidders still outperform the failed bidders in the event 
window [-5, 5]. It appears that the market already knows around the time of the bidding 
who will be successful and who will be unsuccessful. Though target companies are able 
to earn positive abnormal returns on the announcement day as well as during the period 
of [-1, 1], neither results are statistically significant. The last column of Table 8 provides 
a Wilcoxon median test for the significance of differences between medians and zero. 
However, we do not find any significant difference. In order to additional understanding 
of abnormal returns between the successful bidders and the failed bidders, we do the 
t-test and median test for the mean CARs by three event windows in Table 9. The 
p-values of the median test in all three windows are not significantly different from zero. 
 
We further estimate a series of OLS regressions of target and bidder cumulative abnormal 
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returns against the same firm and deal characteristics we have examined in Table 6. Table 
10 reports the results of cross-sectional regression analysis, where dependent variable is 
either target’s CARs or the bidder’s CARs. Aside from the factors mentioned previously, 
we add the Success Dummy as one of the explanatory variables. This inclusion, however, 
did not turn out to be explanatory, which is inconsistent with the findings of Brown and 
Raymond (1986) and Samuelson and Rosenthal (1986). Model 1 in Table 10 shows the 
regression results of the targets on the announcement day [0]. We find that the bidder’s 
high company value (low BTM) and CEO incentive compensation increase the targets 
stock abnormal returns when the M&A is announced, even though the BTM effect is 
weak. In Model 2, only liquidity and Tobin’s Q for the bidders are related with the targets’ 
abnormal returns. However, we are unable to find significant differences in Model 3. It 
might be due to the fact that the effect of these factors should be limited in the short term 
for the targets. 
 
Models 4, 5, and 6 present the result of OLS-regression for the bidders in three event 
windows. Considering Model 4 reporting the results on the announcement day, we 
observe that only industry relatedness has a positively significant influence on the bidders’ 
abnormal returns. If to consider Model 5, only the coefficient estimates for leverage ratio 
and return on equity are significantly different from zero. The lower the leverage of a 
bidding firm, the higher the CAR it will earn around the announcement day. The result is 
contrary to the findings of Maloney et al. (1993) that bidder’s leverage ratio is positively 
associated with acquirer’s three-day CAR. During the event window of [-5, 5], we find 
that the leverage ratio and industry relatedness lose significance. Instead, Tobin’s Q has 
an influence on the bidder CARs, which is consistent with the findings of Lang et al. 
(1991) that bidders with low growth opportunities (low q ratio) negatively effect 
abnormal returns around takeover announcements.  
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6. Conclusions and discussion 
Based on our analysis we are able to identify a number of factors, which have the 
explanatory power to determine the success of M&A transactions in the US market in a 
significant way from 1998 to 2012. We use comparative statics with mean- and median- 
difference tests, logistic regression, and cross-sectional regression analysis, and find that, 
in general, company value (proxied by BTM), bidder’s profitability (proxied by ROE), 
offer attitude, and industry closeness have turned out to be the critical drivers of M&A 
bidding success. Higher company value and profitability, friendly offer, or same primary 
industry can increase the likelihood of being successful in an M&A offer bid. With the 
development of M&A market, bidder and target’s firm size are no longer important 
determinant as they were before. But particularly, for small bidding companies, if they 
want to be the winners in the deal, they are supposed to take more care of the growth 
opportunities as well as the offer attitude. An interesting finding is that in the 
multiple-bidder takeover bids among small bidders (relative to their targets), the attitude 
of being hostile is valued by the potential targets and contributes to the bidding success. 
What’s more, the financial crisis has brought the M&A market into chaos, which leads to 
the failures of all the determinants. In addition, we investigate the influence of these 
factors as well as the deal status on the bidder’s and target’s abnormal returns around the 
announcement date. The results vary according to different event windows. 
 
More importantly, this paper provides an instruction for the failed bidders in the 
multiple-bidder M&A offers. Each deal situation is unique and due diligence must also 
include an understanding of the changing economic environment. 
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7. Limitations and future research 
Even though the new insight and an indicator for the small bidders (relative to the target) 
are strengths of our study, there are also some weaknesses. First, since there is no 
significant relationship between the determinants and the deal status in the sub-sample of 
2007-2012, we think that future research may focus on investigating the cross-boarder 
M&A market during that period. It is likely that more potential determinants expressed by 
the international targets may exist. Second, it is necessary to conduct an in-depth measure 
of dividend policy, which can include the degree of the difference between bidders and 
targets in the explanatory variables (Dereeper and Turki (2013)). By doing so, it can 
provide more insight for a failed competitor in the same takeover offer. Third, the 
payment method plays a key role in the probability of bidding success. Future study may 
focus on all cash mergers or all stock mergers, which can be done manually.
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Table 1: Summary of Multi-Bidder M&A Deals per Year 
This table provides information on the number of takeover bids with multiple-bidders from 1998 to 2012. 
Successful bidders are those firms that succeeded in a bidding war and acquired the target firm, whereas 
failed bidders are those firms that lost in a bidding war.  
Year Targets Successful Bidders Failed Bidders 
1998 28 28 28 
1999 35 35 43 
2000 27 27 38 
2001 22 22 27 
2002 9 9 9 
2003 10 10 13 
2004 9 9 14 
2005 18 18 21 
2006 19 19 23 
2007 8 8 8 
2008 13 13 14 
2009 13 13 14 
2010 10 10 11 
2011 13 13 16 
2012 3 3 3 




Table 2: Definition of Variables 
This table provides the definition and data sources for all dependent and independent variables used in our analyses. 
Variable Variable Name Definition Data Source 
Deal Status Success 
Dummy 
Dummy variable: one if the takeover bid is successful, 
and zero otherwise 
SDC Platinum Database 
Relative Firm Size RSIZE Market value of the bidder’s equity / Market value of 
the target’s equity 
CRSP Database 
Book-to-Market Ratio BTM Book value of the bidding firm / Market value of the 
bidding firm 
Compustat Database 
Dividend Payout  DIVIDPAY Dividends per share / Earnings per share for the 
bidding firm  
Compustat Database 
Liquidity  LIQ (Current assets - Current liabilities) / Total assets for 
the bidding firm  
Compustat Database 
Leverage LEV Total liabilities / Total assets for the bidding firm Compustat Database 
Return on Equity ROE Net income / Shareholders’ equity for the bidding firm Compustat Database 
Offer Attitude Dummy ATTI Dummy variable: one if the takeover bid is friendly, 
and zero otherwise 
SDC Platinum Database 
Growth Opportunities (Tobin’s 
Q) 
TQ Approximate Tobin’s Q = (share price × the number of 
common stock shares outstanding + the value of 
preferred stock + (current liabilities – current assets) + 




Industry Relatedness Dummy IR Dummy variable: one if the first two digits of the 
bidder’s SIC code are the same as the target’s SIC 
code, and zero otherwise. 
Compustat Database 
CEO Incentive Compensation LNCEOINC The natural logarithm of (TDC1-TCC) a Execucomp Database 
a Total compensation (TDC1) includes salary, bonus, the total value of restricted stock granted, the total value of stock options granted (using Black-Scholes), 
and long term incentive payouts. Total cash compensation (TCC) includes salary and bonus. 
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Table 3: Distribution of M&A Deals in the Full Sample (Sample Size: 110) 
This table shows the distribution of takeover bids in our full sample, categorized along three 
dimensions. Our sample includes 110 firms for which all required data is available. 
 Frequency Percent 
Deal Status   
Success 71 64.55 
Failure 39 35.45 
Offer Attitude   
Friendly 74 67.27 
Hostile 36 32.73 
Two-digit SIC Code   
Same 16 14.55 
Different 94 85.45 
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Table 4: Characteristics of the Independent Variables 
This table provides summary statistics for our independent variables, separated by successful and unsuccessful bidders. Obs. is the number of observations in the corresponding category. The 
table reports the average, median, standard deviation minimum, and maximum for each variable. The last two columns provides the results for a Satterthwaite T-test for the significance of 
differences in means and a Wilcoxon median test for the significance of differences in medians between successful and unsuccessful bidders. 









Variable Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max.  Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. 
RSIZE 71 115.2377 4.7940 555.2784 0.0002 4626.52  39 9.0026 1.1529 21.7133 0.0001 99.3133 0.1119 
0.0742
* 












71 0.0684 0.0217 0.1127 0 0.5208  39 0.0974 0.0446 0.1362 0 0.5660 0.2617 0.3212 
LIQ 71 0.1807 0.1422 0.1835 
-0.123
6 








LEV 71 0.5380 0.5457 0.2239 0.0361 0.9508  39 0.5766 0.5698 0.2408 0.1074 0.9508 0.4134 0.3212 
ROE 71 0.0503 0.0311 0.0982 
-0.120
6 
0.5051  39 0.0467 0.0404 0.0852 
-0.053
2 
0.5052 0.8416 0.8427 
ATTI 
(dummy) 





TQ 71 0.4895 0.2136 0.9398 
-0.701
2 
6.3758  39 0.2790 0.1540 0.5347 
-0.410
5 
1.6986 0.1373 0.3212 
IR 
(dummy) 







71 7.8310 8.2831 2.0094 0 10.5203  39 6.9445 7.6557 2.8652 0 11.8527 0.0917* 0.1649 
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Table 5: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables (Sample Size: 110) 
























































































































Table 6: Logit Estimates for the Probability that a Bidding Firm Succeeds in a Bidding War a 
This table presents results for a series of logit regressions used to estimate the effect of different factors on the likelihood of M&A bidding success. 
Our sample consists of 110 takeover bids with multiple bidders that occurred between 1998 and 2012. In each model, the dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the bid is successful, and 0 otherwise. Model 1 presents the relationship between the success rate and CEO 
incentive compensation. Model 2 uses only firm-specific factors as independent variables. Model 3 uses only deal-specific factors as independent 
variables. Model 4 provides comprehensive results based on all variables. Obs. is the number of observations in the corresponding categories. 




Firm-Specific Factors Deal-specific Factors Full Sample 






























































Obs. 110 110 110 110 
Model p-value 0.0635 0.0326 <.0001 <.0001 
a p-values are presented in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
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Table 7: Robustness Tests a 
This table provides the results for a series of robustness tests of our logit regressions in Table 6. In each model, the dependent variable is a dummy variable that is equal 
to 1 if the bid is successful, and 0 otherwise. Model 1 reports results of for a winsorized sample in which we remove the top 2% and bottom 2% of all bids based on 
relative firm size (RSIZE). Model 2 and 3 show the results for two tests in which we exclude leverage (LEV) and liquidity (LIQ) from our list of regressions. Model 4 
and 5 provide estimation results for two sub-samples, with December 2006 as the cutoff point. Model 6 and 7 present estimation results for two sub-samples in which 








1998-2006 2007-2012 𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 ≤ 1 𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 > 1 


































































































































































Obs. 106 110 110 88 22 33 77 
Model 
p-value 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1804 0.2303 <.0001 
a p-values are presented in parentheses 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
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Table 8: Event Study Results 
This table provides information on the mean and median abnormal returns around the announcement day of a takeover bid. Our 
sample includes 110 takeover bids with multiple bidders that occurred between 1998 and 2012. We differentiate between three 
different groups – successful bidders, failed bidders, and target firms. We use the CRSP equally-weighted return as the market 
return and estimate the market model parameters over the period from -255 trading days to -46 days before the event day. The last 
column provides a Wilcoxon median test for the significance of differences between medians and zero. Obs. is the number of 
observations in the corresponding categories. 
Event Window  Mean CAR (%) Median CAR (%) Obs. a  
Wilcoxon test 
(p-value) 
Panel A: CARs for the successful bidders around the announcement date 
[0]  -0.51* -0.09 67 0.2961 
[-1,1]  -0.32 -0.09 67 0.6338 
[-5,5]  -0.19 -0.81 67  0.6786 
Panel B: CARs for the failed bidders around the announcement date 
[0]  -1.26** -1.06 37 0.1660 
[-1,1]  0.38 -1.37 37 0.9170 
[-5,5]  -1.97** -3.40 37 0.1864 
Panel C: CARs for the target firms around the announcement date 
[0]  0.89 -0.46 62 0.5182 
[-1,1]  1.10 -0.62 62 0.6537 
[-5,5]  -0.77 -3.02 62 0.3016 
a the observation is reduced because of the security-events dropped by Eventus. 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
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Table 9: Mean- and Median- Difference Tests between Successful and Failed Bidder CAR 
This table provides information on the cumulative abnormal returns of successful and unsuccessful bidders. Our sample includes 110 takeover bids with multiple bidders during the 
period 1998 and 2012. In the last two columns, we report p-values fro significance tests of differences in mean and median CARs. 





Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max.  Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. Min. Max. (p-value) (p-value) 
[0] 67 -0.0058 -0.0009 0.0453 -0.1978 0.0883  37 -0.0129 -0.0106 0.0557 -0.2315 0.0852 0.5078 0.5409 
[-1, 1] 67 -0.0045 -0.0009 0.0771 -0.2561 0.2410  37 0.0019 -0.0137 0.1072 -0.1717 0.5253 0.7514 0.3081 
[-5, 5] 67 -0.0063 -0.0081 0.1248 -0.3886 0.2846  37 -0.0249 -0.0340 0.1126 -0.1896 0.5031 0.4407 0.3081 
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level  
48 
Table 10: Regression of CARs against Bidding Success a 
This table provides results for a series of OLS regressions of target and bidder cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) against the same firm and deal characteristics we 
examined in Table 6. In each model, the dependent variable is either the target CARs or the bidder CARs. Models 1, 2 and 3 present results for three regressions of 
target CARs during different event windows, while Models 4, 5, 6 provide the corresponding results for bidder CARs. 
 OLS Regressions of Target CARs  OLS Regressions of Bidder CARs 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 































































































































































Obs. 57 59 56  99 99 98 
Adjusted R2 0.1118 0.0151 -0.0302  0.0546 0.0558 -0.0136 
Model p-value 0.1196 0.3967 0.5901  0.1408 0.1366 0.5610 
 
 
a p-values are presented in parentheses  
* indicates significance at the 10 percent level 
** indicates significance at the 5 percent level 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level 
 
 
 
 
